Retrieved, from ĭcf.: How to Use the “meek” Pluggable Transport. KeywordsĪrma.: Obfsproxy: The Next Step in the Censorship Arms Race (2012) Retrieved, from īagley, R., Ferguson, R.I., Leimich, P.: Firefox Browser Forensic Analysis via Recovery of SQLite Artefacts from Unallocated Space (2012)īoggs, R.J., Fenger, T., Sammons, J., Winkler, D.: Online anonymity: forensic analysis of the tor browser bundle (2017)Ĭlark, E., Koppen, G., Murdoch, S., Perry, M.: The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser (2017). As expected, all data was recovered from regular browsing modes, very minimal data from private browsing, and almost no artifacts from TOR. This research not only extends the current field of digital forensics for which artifacts can be found in which locations, but also confirms various claims in regards to the privacy of private browsing modes. After identical data generation across all browsers and modes of browsing in a controlled virtual environment, forensic images were captured then analyzed. Our analysis was primarily conducted using FTK in order to replicate the process and abilities of a digital forensics lab with limited resources. In this chapter, we seek to determine and compare which forensic artifacts can be recovered from Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, their respective private modes, and TOR. Browsers are widely used on personal computers, laptops and mobile devices.
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